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Sometime before I left Wiley in 1990 (I’m not sure of the exact time frame after all these years), Wiley distributed stock 
options to multiple levels of employees (how 
many employees and at what levels, I can’t 
remember either).  It may have been while I 
was running the electronic publishing division, 
which I founded around 1980 and headed up for 
five years, but I can’t remember the details.  In 
any event, not too many years after the options 
were issued, the company’s stock shot up and a 
nice little sudden windfall was there for anyone 
who wished to cash in his or her options. 
W. Bradford Wiley, the company’s chair-
man, urged us to retain the shares.  It wasn’t 
because he feared that dumping a large number 
of shares on the market could all be snapped up 
by someone who might have designs on accu-
mulating a controlling stake in the firm.  The 
options the employees held were for A shares, 
which were non-voting.  The B shares, which 
the Wiley family and its confidants held, were 
the only voting shares.  Mr. Wiley, I believe, 
wanted us to retain a stake in the company for 
which we worked — not a bad idea, of course.
My windfall, which was a bit over $15,000, 
as I recall, was too tempting for me at the time, 
so I cashed in my options.  Later, when I had 
risen to vice-president and general manager 
of all scientific and technical publishing at 
Wiley, I was granted another, larger cache of 
stock options.  When I was fired at 10:30 a.m. 
on January 10, 1990, I could not cash in these 
options for a specified number of days.  (I do 
remember the date and time with precision. 
And just to complete the record, when the 
fiscal year ended less than four months later 
with fine results for the division I headed, I 
and the division’s 135 employees maxed out on 
performance bonuses.  But I digress.)
While I awaited the day when I could cash 
in the options, the stock price slipped slowly 
and steadily.  The person who fired me re-
marked that it was like watching an inheritance 
melt away.  How charming.  Thankfully, the 
bleeding stopped with some cash still available 
to me when my option-maturing day finally 
arrived.
I was reminded of my Wiley stock adven-
tures when I decided to write this issue’s col-
umn about scholarly publishers’ stock prices.  I 
hadn’t thought about them for a while and had 
little idea where they stood.  Of course, there 
has been a great deal of vitriol in academia and 
elsewhere over the past several decades about 
commercial publishers’ substantial profits from 
their journals business.  And if profits were as 
strong as the commercial publishers’ critics 
contended, were their shares tremendously 
attractive?  Would you, no matter how you felt 
about profiting from publishing journals with 
articles based on publicly funded research, be 
interested in investing in these companies with 
a highly profitable business segment?  If only 
the answer were so simple.
I looked at the four largest commercial 
journal publishers, which according to reliable 
sources comprise about 30% of the world’s 
nearly 35,000 peer-reviewed scholarly jour-
nals:  Springer, with about 3,000 journals; 
Elsevier with maybe a few more;  Wiley, with 
more than 2,300;  and Taylor & Francis, with 
about 2,100.
Let’s take Springer first.  It’s now part of 
Springer Nature, which was formed in 2015 
through the merger of Nature Publishing 
Group, Palgrave Macmillan, Macmillan 
Education and Springer Science+Business 
Media.  Springer Nature has sales of 1.5 
billion Euros, and bills itself as the world’s 
largest academic book publisher.  If you read 
analysts’ reports on scholarly publishers, schol-
arly book publishing isn’t a space with a great 
deal of promise, which is something a potential 
investor would need to take into account.  If 
you could get a piece of the action, that is. 
In the case of Springer Nature, privately 
held Holtzbrinck Publishing Group, head-
quartered in Stuttgart, owns 53%.  The group, 
established by Georg von Holtzbrinck in 
1948, began as a German book club.  In the 
1960s, it moved into publishing, first by pur-
chasing two German publishing companies. 
In the 1980s, Holtzbrinck, acquired the retail 
book division of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
naming it the Henry Holt Book Company, and 
Scientific American magazine.  In the 1990s, it 
purchased a majority interest in distinguished 
trade publisher Farrar, Straus & Giroux and 
then all of The Macmillan Group.  Now it’s 
much grander.
London-based BC Partners, which owns 
the other 47% of Springer Nature, is a pri-
vate equity firm specializing in buyouts and 
acquisitions financing across all industries in 
Europe and the United States.  It raises funds 
in the billions of dollars.  The firm was founded 
in 1986 and is a major large cap private equity 
firm on the scale of Blackstone Group and 
The Carlyle Group.  BC was formed original-
ly by the financial firm Barings to advise funds 
providing development capital, in particular 
for management buyouts.  The principals of 
Baring Capital Investors completed a spinout 
of what would become BC Partners following 
Barings’ famous 1995 collapse resulting from 
poor speculative investments of a total of $1.3 
billion, primarily in futures contracts, pulled off 
by a freewheeling Singapore office employee 
named Nick Leeson.  The firm’s most suc-
cessful and profitable investments include an 
acute care hospital provider and independent 
provider of psychiatric care, a seller of alco-
holic and non-alcoholic beverages, a cheese 
company and a UK mobile phone provider 
(now bankrupt).
The bottom line is that you can’t get a piece 
of Springer these days, so you don’t have to 
worry that its book business is so large.  
Now for Taylor & Francis.  It’s now part 
of Informa, which has its head office in Lon-
don, is listed on the London Stock Exchange 
and is a member of the FTSE 100.  It owns 
numerous companies in addition to Taylor & 
Francis, including CRC Press, Datamonitor, 
Institute for International Research, Lloyd’s 
List (London Press Lloyd), and Routledge. 
Besides publishing, Informa has operations 
in the areas of performance improvement and 
management consulting, and it runs more than 
10,000 conferences annually.  Ten years ago, 
Informa was approached by Springer Science 
and Business Media (now part of Springer 
Nature; see above) in a takeover bid, but the 
Informa board rejected the offer as too low.  
Three years ago, Informa acquired the assets 
of Elsevier Business Intelligence (EBI) from 
Reed Elsevier, which were combined with oth-
er properties to create the Pharma Intelligence 
division of Informa Business Information.
So if you want to invest in Taylor & Fran-
cis, you have to buy shares in its conglomerate 
parent, Informa, which because of its diver-
sity, may be safer than owning stock in a pure 
publisher like Taylor & Francis.  Just saying. 
I’m not here to give investment advice.  For 
that you should call your broker, which is what 
I did when it came to Elsevier and Wiley, the 
other two entities on the four largest journal 
publishers list.  Elsevier is part of what is 
now called RELX, which has a market cap of 
around $40 billion and is trading in the high 
teens, while Wiley, with a market cap of about 
$3 billion is trading in the low to mid fifties.  
My broker sent me Morning Star Equity 
Analyst Reports for both RELX and Wiley. 
These reports are thorough examinations of 
company operations and prospects.  The re-
ports start with a brief pros and cons section 
(what “Bulls Say” and what “Bears Say”) and 
then get into several pages of analysis that is 
very specific and struck me as well-reasoned. 
The reports analyze a company’s “economic 
moat” (“a structural feature that allows a firm 
to sustain excess profits over a long period of 
time”), risks and management, among other 
factors.  The reports, which I can’t quote direct-
ly, culminate in a rating between one and five 
stars for what is called a “risk-adjusted return.” 
As I implied, to see the ratings and read the 
reports, you’ll have to get them from a source 
that subscribes to them.  In the case of Else-
vier and Wiley, I found the reports absorbing 
reading and a bit surprising.  Without giving 
anything away, I will say that neither company 
is, at the present moment, doomed, according 
to reputable equity analysis — although that 
isn’t what I found surprising.  
